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Abstract 
Slot-filling theories of conceptual combination assume that 
both constituent concepts are activated before they are 
combined. However, these theories have difficulty in 
explaining why combined phrase features are sometimes more 
available than the features of the constituent nouns. In this 
study, we investigate the time course of conceptual 
knowledge activation. Using three verification tasks of 
varying complexity we demonstrate that basic taxonomic 
knowledge is retrieved more quickly than modal specific 
conceptual features. Applying this finding to conceptual 
combination, we demonstrate that participants take longer to 
reject combinations requiring the activation of instance 
specific features (e.g. frog tail) than those that can be rejected 
based on more generalized taxonomic knowledge (e.g. 
daffodil tail). These findings provide convergent evidence that 
conceptual knowledge is activated dynamically and 
selectively rather than all at once. We discuss the implications 
for existing theories. 
Keywords: Conceptual combination; noun-noun compounds; 
knowledge representation; knowledge activation. 
Introduction 
The combination of two words is a technique commonly 
adopted by speakers in order to refer to novel concepts and 
ideas (e.g. holiday tension, picnic bee). Although people 
have a well developed means of understanding these novel 
compounds, the associated comprehension process is not 
trivial, requiring many levels of understanding. 
Accordingly, the study of conceptual combination is 
important, both because it is intimately associated with the 
generativity and comprehension of natural language and 
because it is important for understanding how people 
represent concepts. In English, a language in which 
compounding is particularly productive, combinations 
consist of a modifier followed by a head noun. Usually, the 
head noun denotes the main category while the modifier 
implies a relevant subcategory or a modification of that set’s 
typical members.  In this way, kitchen chair is interpreted as 
a particular type of chair, and more precisely as the type that 
is located in kitchens.  
Thus far, theories of conceptual combination have 
generally assumed that the comprehension of a compound 
phrase is dependent on both concepts being fully activated. 
For example, the Concept Specialization model (Murphy, 
1988) assumes a schema structure for concepts, consisting 
of a series of slots. This theory proposes that during the 
combination process the modifying concept fills one or 
more of the slots in the head noun concept. First, the 
appropriate slot is selected based on world knowledge about 
the constituent concepts and subsequently this combined 
concept is elaborated (e.g. realizing that a car magazine is 
likely to have a picture of a car on the front cover).  
According to the slot-filling view, an identical set of 
features is activated whenever a particular concept is used in 
combination, regardless of the noun it is paired with. 
Clearly though, people cannot retrieve all associated 
knowledge about a concept every time it is encountered. 
Much of that information would be irrelevant and would 
impair rather than aid comprehension. A more economical 
approach would be for conceptual information to be 
activated selectively, thereby avoiding the need for 
additional processes to suppress irrelevant information. 
However, current theories of conceptual combination offer 
no clue as to how a selective activation process might 
operate. 
The inadequacy of slot-filling theories is highlighted by 
their inability to explain key observations relating to 
knowledge availability. Springer and Murphy (1992) 
compared the time taken to verify a property that was true of 
the head versus a property that was true of the phrase. For 
instance, the feature green applies to both celery and boiled 
celery (noun feature). In contrast, the feature soft is only 
valid for boiled celery (phrase feature). Based on the idea 
that concepts must be fully activated before being 
combined, Springer and Murphy expected that the noun 
property would be verified more quickly than the phrase 
property. However, the opposite findings emerged, with 
participants being quicker to verify the phrase property (i.e. 
that boiled celery is soft). According to Springer and 
Murphy, these findings are paradoxical because they 
suggest that emergent features of the combined concept are 
activated before the features of the constituent concepts. 
One possible explanation for this result is that people 
become aware of a compound phrase structure before 
activating the constituent nouns and are therefore in a 
position to activate only the conceptual knowledge that is 
relevant to the combination. The idea that word meanings 
emerge gradually rather than all at once is well supported. 
For example, Till, Mross & Kintsch (1988) identified clear 
stages in word comprehension, with sense selection 
occurring around 400ms and further semantic inferences 
following around 1,000ms. Eye-tracking measures show 
that eye fixations last on average 200ms during the reading 
of linguistic text (Rayner, 1988), suggesting that people will 
be able to retrieve preferentially those features that are 
relevant to the combination. In this case, the instantiation of 
the concept boiled celery should proceed in much the same 
way as if it was referenced by a single label, in that the 
properties of ordinary celery that are not pertinent to boiled 
celery should not be activated.  
The enabling condition for selective activation is that 
knowledge retrieval is a gradual incremental process rather 
than an all at once phenomenon. The existence of a 
distinction between different levels of conceptual detail is 
well supported by neurological evidence. For example, 
Warrington (1975) described a patient with a dementing 
illness who had lost subordinate attribute information (e.g. 
knowing that a cabbage was green) yet retained 
superordinate classification information (e.g. knowing that a 
cabbage was a plant). Also, several distinct event-related 
brain potentials have been identified that occur at different 
time intervals during concept activation (Kumar & 
Debruille, 2004). These have been linked to various 
different stages of the knowledge activation process, 
specifically phonological matching, activation of syntactic 
word category information, semantic processing, evaluation 
and finally representation construction.  
In light of this, we propose that knowledge activation is a 
dynamic process and that this phenomenon can successfully 
explain how phrase features for conceptual combinations 
can be more available than noun features. In this paper we 
present two experiments which investigate this possibility. 
In the first we compare response times for three verification 
tasks of differing complexity. In the second we apply these 
findings to conceptual combination and investigate the time 
taken to reject phrases requiring the activation of different 
levels of conceptual detail. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of this experiment was to present participants with 
a series of words and to analyze the time taken to verify 
different conceptual features. We wished to ascertain 
whether the more general taxonomic knowledge about a 
concept becomes available prior to the retrieval of detailed 
features. For example, do people realize that a dog is a thing 
before they realize that it is an animal? Do they realize it is 
an animal before they know what it looks like?  
We required a set of verification tasks that would test the 
availability of different conceptual features. Three tasks 
were selected, one requiring word-level information (does it 
name a thing?), a second requiring the activation of basic 
conceptual knowledge (is this thing alive?) and a third 
requiring the activation of a specific perceptual feature (is 
this organism hairy?). In the latter task, the hairiness 
attribute was selected because this information is not 
accurately reflected by the conceptual hierarchy (e.g. 
although many mammals have hair, hippos and rhinos do 
not). Importantly, for all three tasks, the concepts did not 
need to be situated within a context in order to verify the 
relevant property. Given our hypothesis that the activation 
of conceptual knowledge proceeds from the basic to the 
more detailed, we predicted the following trend in response 
times: Object < Animate < Feature.  
Method 
Participants Twenty-seven first year undergraduate 
students from University College Dublin participated in the 
experiment for partial course credit.  
 
Design The experiment used a within-participants design, 
with three conditions corresponding to the three verification 
tasks, namely Object, Animate and Feature. In order to 
facilitate a within-participants design it was necessary to use 
a separate list of words for each condition. Had the same list 
been used for all three tasks, then the equal partitioning of 
true and false responses would not have been possible. Each 
participant saw the same set of 180 stimuli, comprising the 
three conditions of 60 items each.  
This design improves on that of previous verification tasks 
(e.g. McElree & Murphy, 2006) involving the introduction 
of an additional concept (e.g. boiled celery is soft). In our 
experiment, the words under consideration are presented on 
their own. Participants are already aware of the feature to be 
verified so they are not required to activate information 
about other concepts in order to respond. In addition, 
participants apply the same verification task to a broad 
variety of words, therefore providing a more reliable 
measure of feature availability.  
 
Materials We compiled separate lists of 60 different nouns 
for each of the three conditions. In each we included 30 
items which were representative of the feature being 
verified and 30 items which were not. In the Object 
condition, half of the items were nouns (e.g. vase, couch) 
while the other half were connectives and other parts of 
speech (e.g. because, when). In the Animate condition, half 
of the items were organisms (e.g. mouse, tulip) while half 
were artifacts (e.g. shed, pebble). In the Feature condition, 
half of the items were haired creatures (e.g. leopard, panda) 
while the other half were hairless (e.g. whale, rhinoceros). 
All sets of words were controlled for length and familiarity. 
Analysis revealed no significant differences in average word 
length between the three conditions (5.2, 5.1 and 5.5 for the 
Object, Animate and Feature conditions respectively, F(2, 
177)  = 1.5, p =.22). There were also no significant 
differences between average word lengths for the 
representative and non-representative items in the Object 
condition (5.3 and 5.0 respectively, t(58) = .83, p = .41), the 
Animate condition (5.1 and 5.2, t(58) = -.22, p = .83) and 
the Feature condition (5.4 and 5.6, t(58) = -.57, p = .84). 
The familiarity of the nouns in the various conditions was 
compared by taking the log of their BNC frequency. This 
revealed no significant differences in frequency for the 
representative items (3.0, 2.8 and 2.9 for the Object, 
Animate and Feature conditions respectively, F(2, 87)  = 
.69, p = .50). Furthermore, there was also no significant 
difference in the log of the frequency for the representative 
and non-representative items in the Animate (2.8 and 3.0, 
t(58) = -1.01, p = .32) and the Feature conditions (2.9 and 
2.8, t(58) = .87, p = .39). We did not include the frequencies 
of the non-nouns in our analyses, as a comparison of this 
nature would have been misleading. The relationship 
between familiarity and frequency of use is not consistent 
when comparing nouns with other parts of speech. All of the 
nouns included in our experiment were associated with 
tangible manifestations (e.g. artifacts and plants), meaning 
that even those with a relatively low frequency were 
recognizable (e.g. walrus occurs only 64 times in the BNC). 
In contrast, non-nouns can occur more frequently yet be 
unfamiliar due to their abstractness (e.g. trenchant has a 
BNC frequency of 74). In order that all of the words in our 
Object condition be comparatively familiar, the frequency 
of our non-nouns was necessarily higher (4.5).  
 
Procedure Participants sat in front of a computer screen and 
placed the index finger of their left hand on the F key of the 
computer keyboard and the index finger of their right hand 
on the J key. They were informed that a series of words 
would be displayed on the screen and that the objective was 
to decide whether the words were representative of the 
feature in question, pressing J for ‘yes’ and F for ‘no’. For 
the Object condition, the task presented to participants was 
to verify whether the word in question referred to a thing or 
not. For the Animate condition, the task was to decide if the 
item in question was alive or not. For the Feature condition, 
the task was to decide if the animal in question was covered 
in hair. Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were 
provided with several worked examples in order to 
demonstrate the nature of the verification task. During the 
experiment, words appeared in the middle of the screen and 
participants had to make a decision by pressing the 
appropriate key. Trials were separated by a blank screen 
lasting for one second. 
Each condition began with 10 practice trials which did not 
form part of the experiment. The purpose of these trials was 
to allow participants to adjust to the task, although they 
were not aware that the trials in question would not be 
included. Subsequently, the 60 experimental stimuli 
followed seamlessly. In each condition, the words were 
presented in a random order to each participant. 
Furthermore, the three conditions were randomized so that 
participants performed the tasks in a different order. 
Results and Discussion 
A total of 6.5% of the data were omitted from the analysis. 
3.7% of responses were incorrect and hence these trials 
were not considered. Additionally, response times deemed 
unreasonably fast (< 400ms, 0.1%) or unreasonably slow (> 
4000, 0.6%) were also excluded. After this initial 
elimination process, any remaining response times which 
were more than three standard deviations outside each 
participant’s mean for that condition were also excluded. 
This eliminated a further 2.0% of trials. 
The mean response times were 738, 802 and 884 ms for 
the Object, Animate and Feature conditions respectively. 
Further analysis revealed that the mean response times for 
the representative items in the three conditions were 727, 
768 and 873 ms while the mean response times for the non-
representative items were 749, 837 and 897 ms respectively. 
These data are illustrated below. 
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Figure 1. Mean positive and negative response times (ms) 
 
We conducted a series of ANOVAs in order to examine 
the differences between the various conditions. For the by-
participants analysis we computed a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA, with three levels corresponding to the 
different tasks and two levels corresponding to the 
appropriate response type, all within-participants. For the 
by-items analysis we computed a non-repeated measures 
ANOVA with two fixed factors. There was no significant 
interaction between task and response, F1 (2, 52)  = 2.48, p 
= .09, MSE = 3652.76; F2 (2, 174)  = 1.28, p = .28, MSE = 
6816.40. However, there was a significant main effect of 
task, F1 (2, 52)  = 21.89, p < .001, MSE = 16321.42; F2 (2, 
174)  = 54.32, p < .001, MSE = 370306.12. A Page’s L 
trend analysis revealed a significant increasing trend in 
response times according to Object < Animate < Feature, 
L(2) = 364, p < 0.01. In other words, participants were able 
to verify that a word was a thing before they were able to 
verify that it was alive or that it had hair. This pattern of 
results supports our view of knowledge activation as 
constituting a dynamic, incremental process.  
There was also a significant main effect of response, F1 (1, 
26) = 23.20, p < .001, MSE = 3987.85; F2 (1, 174)  = 13.78, 
p < .001, MSE = 93960.26. Thus, across all three 
conditions, participants were quicker at verifying word 
features than they were at discounting them. This pattern of 
results suggests that property verification involves some 
kind of active search process which terminates as soon as 
confirming information is identified but which otherwise 
continues until a certain threshold of certainty is reached. 
This challenges the notion that people store information 
about concepts in a propositional format, as assumed by the 
schema-structures used in slot-filling models. For example, 
if the knowledge as to whether an animal is hairy or not is 
explicitly stored with that concept then there should be no 
difference between the time needed to confirm or discount 
the feature. The fact that we observed a difference suggests 
that the verification process involves more than simply 
accessing propositional knowledge.  
The idea of a gradual knowledge activation process may 
explain some features of conceptual combination which 
could not be accounted for by schema-based theories, such 
as the fact that phrase features can be verified more quickly 
than noun features. If the most basic knowledge about 
concepts is activated first, then this provides a means by 
which more detailed information can be activated 
selectively (i.e. only the combined concept itself need be 
simulated). In the following experiment we investigate 
whether dynamic knowledge activation can contribute to the 
understanding of how concepts are combined. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether 
dynamic knowledge activation can explain some of the 
counterintuitive effects observed involving conceptual 
combination (e.g. Springer and Murphy, 1992). Specifically, 
we wished to ascertain whether the combination process 
begins before the constituent concepts have been fully 
activated. In order to do this, we created two conditions of 
implausible combinations, one where explicit featural 
knowledge was required in order to reject the combination 
(e.g. frog tail), and another where more basic taxonomic 
knowledge was sufficient (e.g. daffodil tail). Our hypothesis 
was that participants would reject combinations from the 
Basic condition more quickly than those from the Detailed 
condition, based on the differences in time taken to activate 
the requisite knowledge. 
Existing theories of conceptual combination have 
difficulties in explaining how combinations can be rejected 
as implausible. The Competition Among Relations in 
Nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) 
proposes that combinations are interpreted by applying one 
of a small set of possible relations to the constituent nouns. 
The theory therefore implies that combinations can only be 
rejected when every single possible relation has been 
applied and none result in a satisfactory interpretation. 
People cannot know if a relation will be successful or not 
until they apply it, meaning that they have to option but to 
apply them all. According to the CARIN theory then, there 
should be no difference in the time taken to reject 
combinations from either condition. Slot-filling theories 
suggest that the modifier fills a slot in the head noun and 
that this process is guided by general knowledge about the 
two concepts. These theories assume that both concepts are 
completely activated prior to their combination (e.g. 
Murphy, 1988). If people have retrieved the concepts frog 
and tail before attempting to combine them, then they will 
be aware that tail cannot fill the <has as body part> slot in 
frog since frogs do not have tails. On the other hand, the 
link between daffodil with tail is less obvious, suggesting 
that a more extensive search for plausible relationships will 
be required before this combination can be ruled out. Thus, 
the slot-filling view predicts that frog tail should be easier to 
dismiss as the appropriate slot and filler are clear yet 
obviously incompatible. 
According to our dynamic activation view, the 
combination process will begin before both nouns have been 
fully activated. Daffodil tail can be rejected as soon as the 
basic semantic categories of the constituent concepts 
becomes available since the pairing <plant-body part> does 
not match a productive pattern. On the other hand, frog tail 
matches a very productive pattern and can only be rejected 
when the precise knowledge that frogs do not have tails 
becomes available. We propose that this detailed knowledge 
about frogs will only be activated when people attempt to 
visualize the combined concept and fail. Accordingly, we 
propose that combinations in the Detailed condition will 
take longer to reject than those in the Basic condition.  
Method 
Participants Twenty-six first year undergraduate students 
from University College Dublin participated in the 
experiment for partial course credit. 
 
Design A within-participants design was used for the 
experimental manipulation of condition. Each participant 
saw the same set of 80 stimuli, comprising the two 
conditions of 20 items each and the 40 sensible fillers. 
 
Materials Twenty combinations were generated for each of 
the conditions. For the Detailed condition, this set 
constituted a series of combinations that were exemplars of 
a productive pattern of combination (e.g. <animal-body 
part>). However, all happened to be implausible by virtue of 
some instance-specific detail of one of the constituents. For 
example, frog tail is an implausible combination since frogs 
do not have tails, yet many other reptiles and animals do. 
Raspberry peel is implausible since raspberries cannot be 
peeled, yet many other fruits can. Also, train tyres are 
implausible because trains do not have tyres, yet many other 
vehicles have tyres. In the Basic condition we created a 
matching set of combinations which substituted the concept 
for which detailed knowledge was required. This substituted 
concept was too far removed in the conceptual hierarchy to 
yield a sensible combination.  For example, both daffodil 
and frog are organisms. However, daffodil is a plant and the 
lowest common abstraction of entities that tend to have tails 
is animal. Our hypothesis was that daffodil tail would be 
rejected before frog tail because the knowledge that 
daffodils are not animals would be activated before the 
knowledge that frogs do not have tails. In other examples, 
raspberry peel was paired with doughnut peel and train 
tyres was paired with vase tyres.  
The combinations were controlled for length and also for 
familiarity. The average number of letters in the Detailed 
and Basic conditions was not significantly different (both 
10.75). The average number of syllables between these 
conditions was not significantly different (both 3.25). The 
log of the average BNC frequency of the words used in the 
Detailed and Basic conditions was not significantly different 
(6.1 and 6.3 respectively, t(19) = -.99, p = .33). Finally, the 
log of the Google frequency of the combinations used in 
both conditions was not significantly different (2.7 and 2.3 
respectively, t(19) = 1.81, p = .09), which was to be 
expected given that none of the combinations were intended 
to be sensible. 
As well as the 40 implausible stimuli we also included 40 
sensible filler items in order to balance the sample (e.g. 
tomato sandwich). We avoided including overtly lexicalized 
items, in order that participants would be required to 
actively combine the constituent concepts. 
 
Procedure Participants sat in front of a computer screen and 
placed the index finger of their left hand on the F key of the 
computer keyboard and the index finger of their right hand 
on the J key. They were informed that a series of noun-noun 
compounds would be displayed on the screen for which they 
would have to make plausibility judgments, pressing J for 
plausible and F for implausible. Each trial was separated by 
a blank screen lasting for one second. The combination then 
appeared in the middle of the screen and participants had to 
make a decision by pressing the appropriate key. 
Participants were initially given a short practice session 
where feedback was given regarding their judgments. The 
aim of this practice session was to familiarize them with the 
process of making quick plausibility judgments and also to 
set a reliable threshold for plausibility. After completing the 
practice session, participants were instructed that they were 
now beginning the experiment. The stimuli were then 
presented in a random order to each participant. 
Results and Discussion 
A total of 14.5% of the data were omitted from the analysis. 
We eliminated any positive responses to the implausible 
stimuli (12.5%). Additionally, response times deemed 
unreasonably fast (< 400ms, 0.1%) or unreasonably slow (> 
4000, 1.6%) were also excluded. After this initial 
elimination process, any remaining response times which 
were more than three standard deviations outside each 
participant’s mean for that condition were also excluded. 
This eliminated a further 0.3% of trials. 
The average response time for the Detailed condition was 
1,503ms while that for the Basic condition was 1,333ms. 
Repeated measures ANOVAs revealed that this difference 
was significant both by-items and by-participants, F1(1,25)  
= 27.89, p < .001, MSE = 12360.01; F2(1,19)  = 9.53, p < 
.01, MSE = 48560.09. The difference in accuracy for the 
Detailed and Basic conditions (93% and 78% respectively) 
was also significant both by-items and by participants, 
F1(1,25)  = 17.47, p < .001, MSE = 6.36; F2(1,19)  = 15.80, 
p < .001, MSE = 9.14. Only two of the stimuli were 
incorrectly judged by the majority of participants (both 
Detailed), namely liquid ice (13 correct responses) and 
evening sunrise (9 correct responses).  
 These results demonstrate that participants were quicker 
and more accurate in dismissing the Basic combinations 
than the Detailed combinations. This finding provides 
converging evidence that knowledge activation is not an all 
at once phenomenon, therefore providing a means by which 
conceptual information might be activated selectively in 
combination. Importantly, the difference in response times 
between both conditions indicates that the combination 
process begins before all knowledge relevant to the 
constituent nouns has been activated. Had the participants in 
our experiment activated both concepts first, then the items 
in the Detailed condition would certainly have been rejected 
first: a full representation of frog and tail would have 
permitted the speedy realization that the concepts were 
incompatible. 
This experiment has demonstrated that implausible 
combinations can be quickly and reliably rejected without 
the need for a long search for potential interpretations. Yet, 
how could participants be confident that a combination was 
not sensible before trying every single possibility? Clearly, 
they must have been relying on some kind of heuristic in 
order to guide the combination process, or else the more 
ambiguous items in the Basic condition would have taken 
longer to reject. Given the finding of Experiment 1 that 
basic taxonomic knowledge is the first to be activated, we 
propose that people rely on this information in order to 
constrain the interpretation process, and that more detailed 
information is applied selectively, thereby ‘homing in’ on 
the precise meaning of the combination. For example, 
knowing that frog is an animal and that tail is a body part is 
enough to strongly suggest the <has> relation, thereby 
greatly reducing the range of possible interpretations which 
must be considered. Similarly, the knowledge that daffodil 
is a plant is sufficient for dismissing daffodil tail since the 
pattern <plant-body part> is highly irregular. In sum, we 
propose that people are sensitive to how different types of 
concept tend to interact in combination and that they use 
this heuristic in order to activate conceptual detail 
selectively. This guided selective activation process might 
explain how people can interpret potentially ambiguous 
combinations so quickly and so reliably, an issue which 
previous theories have failed to explain satisfactorily. 
General Discussion 
We have provided evidence that conceptual knowledge is 
activated dynamically, with detailed features being less 
available than more basic taxonomic knowledge. One 
reason for this effect might be that the latter is represented 
amodally while the verification of specific features requires 
the manipulation of a representation. Most interpretations of 
property verification tasks have assumed that participants 
make use of amodal representations, accessing data 
structures such as semantic networks, feature lists or 
schemas in order to find the required information. In 
contrast, our results have suggested that conceptual 
knowledge is not stored in this way.  
Much evidence has been garnered supporting the idea that 
a significant part of conceptual knowledge is modality-
specific. Barsalou (2005) maintains that during property 
verification, people scan mental simulations in order to 
evaluate whether test properties can be perceived. This view 
is supported by numerous studies showing that variables 
such as occlusion, size, shape and orientation affect 
conceptual processing.  For example, Solomon and Barsalou 
(2004) analyzed response times for a property verification 
task and found that as features became larger, they took 
longer to verify, suggesting that people must attend to 
particular regions of a simulation in order to perceive a 
feature. Supporting this stance, many of our participants 
reported using visual imagery in order to discriminate 
between hairy and non-hairy animals, particularly in cases 
where this information could not be deduced from the 
conceptual hierarchy. The idea that people instantiate 
concepts visually in order to verify visual features would 
explain the differences in response time between our 
conditions. For example, it may be the case that participants 
had to instantiate a visual representation of a rhinoceros 
before being able to tell whether it was hairy or not, thus 
lengthening the response time for this task. The greater the 
level of representational manipulation required, the longer 
the time taken to verify the feature.  
Barsalou (2005) proposed that rather than being regarded 
as a general description of a category, a concept can be 
more accurately described as the productive ability to 
generate many different situated conceptualizations. For 
example, traditional models involving conceptual 
knowledge view the concept dog as a detached collection of 
amodal facts that becomes active as a whole every time the 
category is processed. However, this idea cannot provide for 
the specialized inferences needed in particular situations 
(e.g. a growling guard-dog as opposed to a playful pup). An 
understanding of the concept entails the ability to produce a 
wide variety of situated conceptualizations that support goal 
achievement in specific contexts. In light of this, the 
concept for dog cannot simply be a detached global 
description of a fixed set of propositional features.  
This view is compatible with the findings of our 
experiments. Basic taxonomic knowledge is likely to be 
stored propositionally in order to facilitate conceptualization 
(e.g. knowing whether a word refers to a thing, or whether 
that thing is an artefact or an organism). However, for 
reasons of economy, the number of features stored in this 
way is likely to be relatively small. More obscure properties 
are likely to be verified by scrutinizing a modal-specific 
simulation. However, if basic taxonomic knowledge is 
sufficient for indicating how the constituent nouns of a 
combination are related, then this can be used to inform the 
activation process so that only the combined concept need 
be simulated. 
Conclusion 
We have shown that conceptual knowledge is activated 
dynamically, with generalized taxonomic information being 
more available than specific features. Our findings are 
compatible with previous findings in neuroscience (e.g. 
Kumar & Debruille, 2004; Warrington, 1975) and 
psycholinguistics (e.g. Solomon & Barsalou, 2004) and 
suggest a distinction in how people represent different types 
of information. We have shown that the phenomenon of 
dynamic knowledge activation may be crucial to the 
understanding of how concepts are combined. The idea of a 
selective activation process can successfully explain how 
people avoid accessing conceptual information that is not 
relevant to a combination. Future work should investigate in 
more detail how conceptual knowledge is represented in 
memory and further analysis of the processes involved in 
conceptual combination may prove revealing in this regard. 
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